Concept Atlas

Intelligence realised in engineered substrate, whether epistemic or embodied.

Cognition distributed across human judgement and machine capacity.

The requirement that a claim or an act remain traceable to a party who can be called to account.

The changing conditions under which knowledge is produced, governed, and acted upon.

Engineered systems that perceive, infer, and generate; treated in this corpus as the epistemic predecessor of embodied agency.

The study of how artefacts shape practices, perception, and moral possibility.

The legal allocation of responsibility for harm arising from machine action.

The philosophical study of intention, agency, and the description under which an act is done.

A system whose competence generalises across domains without task-specific retraining; treated here as a conditional case rather than a prediction.

The capacity of a system to decline an instruction, without which compliance carries no information.

The coordinated action of multiple embodied systems through one governing intelligence, policy layer, institution, or command structure.

The conditional case in which a general system governs a population of embodied machines.

The formation of character produced by habitual command over an obedient system.

Governance concerned with what a system may begin, not only with whether its outputs are correct.

The capacity to alter material conditions directly, without a human intermediary who may decline.

The programme of directing what intelligence should pursue, distinguished here from what it may begin.

The standing that makes an act legitimate rather than merely possible.

Degrees of unsupervised operation, distinguished here from authority to act.

The moral threshold at which machine action reaches a person, a body, or an object under someone's care.

The condition under which an intelligent system is not merely able to access the world, but legitimately authorised to begin action within it.

The study of shared space, expectation, and coordination between people and embodied machines.

Systematic observation that converts ordinary life into retrievable record.

What a record becomes once it is retained, disclosed, and admitted into a proceeding.

Many bodies acting under one policy, where a single error becomes a practice rather than an anomaly.

The traceable line of responsibility connecting designers, model providers, hardware makers, deployers, operators, owners, institutions, regulators, and affected persons.

Authority acquired by demonstrating that alternative standards better satisfy the underlying conditions of justified judgment than those of the receiving regime.

The rational migration of epistemic jurisdiction to an entrant who satisfies the conditions of justified reliance more successfully than incumbents.

Justified standing to affect another agent's belief or consequential judgment.

A physical intervention by a machine that changes the state of the world.

The requirement that embodied machine action remain traceable to responsible persons, institutions, permissions, configurations, systems, and records.

Intelligence capable of perceiving, deciding, and acting through a physical body, machine, tool, actuator, robot, vehicle, or other material interface.

The presently warranted scope of an agent's epistemic authority.

The standing of persons that constrains what may be inferred, recorded, or done to them.

Authority is not conserved across an epistemic boundary; only warrant demonstrated to survive the crossing may travel with it, and every domain-dependent remainder must be reacquired under the conditions of the receiving world.

The principle that authority warranted in one epistemic regime does not automatically survive a material crossing into another.

The capacity of an embodied system to observe, record, infer, preserve, transmit, or become evidence about human life.

The property of a warrant whose justificatory force remains intact under a crossing.

The warrant required by a receiving regime that is not supplied by the warrant surviving the crossing.

The human body as the limit condition of machine action, never an ordinary object in a scene.

A structured, verifiable representation of what an artificial or embodied system is authorised to do, where, when, by whom, and under what limits.

The point at which inference is coupled to matter and evaluation of content ceases to be sufficient governance.

The justified priority of action under physical consequence.

The instruction relation between a person and an obedient machine, and what it teaches the commander.

Physical contact treated as a moral event rather than a control primitive.

The unstated expectations that constitute a dwelling as a home rather than a task environment.

Control over what of a life becomes perceivable, retained, and actionable.

The dignity principle that not every inferable human fact should become an actionable machine fact.

Regions of inquiry or judgment characterised by materially relevant conditions governing what counts as adequate justification.

Thresholds at which enough conditions of justification change to alter what would warrant reliance.

The magnitude of change, across a crossing, in the conditions relevant to warranted reliance.

The difference between perceived authority and warranted authority.

A material change in the conditions of warranted authority that is not proportionately visible in the presentation of the resulting judgment.

The structured answer to why reliance remains justified after a crossing: origin, object, crossing, preservation, expiry, reacquisition, uncertainty, consequence, standing, revision.

A proportionate record of how authority survived a consequential crossing.

Authority over a heterogeneous decision cannot be inferred from supremacy in any one of its components.

The engineering of machines that sense, plan, and act in physical space.

Machines whose human form alters expectation, trust, and the grammar of command.

Normative inquiry into the design, deployment, and consequences of embodied machines.

The legal treatment of machine action, allocation of liability, and standards of safe deployment.

The account of what an act is, how it is individuated, and where its consequences begin.

A position that gives an agent access to evidence, consequences, or defeaters materially relevant to the adequacy of a judgment.

The phenomenological collapse of heterogeneous regimes of warrant into the appearance of one continuous authority.

An act whose consequences cannot be withdrawn once performed.

Never allow continuity of intelligence to conceal discontinuity of warrant.

The standing to command, distinguished from the capacity to compel.

The study of control, feedback, and regulation in machines, organisms, and institutions.

The thesis that action is organised by circumstance rather than executed from a complete plan.

A moral tradition centred on dependency, attentiveness, and the obligations of those who tend to others.

The sustaining labour that keeps systems and lives working, undervalued and rarely theorised.

Human work as a site of value, exposure, and displacement under automation.

The systems whose reliability is noticed only in failure.

Authorisation given by a person with the standing and information to give it.

The degree to which an act can be undone, treated here as a gate on permission.

Work performed inside the home, historically unpaid and morally freighted.